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Introduction
The Eurozone debt crisis has revived the debate about deeper fiscal integration in the European 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Some observers  argue that fiscal risk sharing is necessary 
to make the Eurozone more resilient to macroeconomic shocks and to avoid its break-up. How-
ever, the main concerns relate to the issues of permanent transfers across Member States and 
moral hazard. The 2012 Four Presidents’ Report suggested that fiscal integration could include a 
common unemployment insurance system. A White Paper outlining further steps necessary to 
complete EMU is to be released by the European Commission in the spring of 2017. This ZEW 
policy brief presents new research findings on the stabilizing and redistributive effects of a com-
mon unemployment insurance scheme for the euro area (henceforth EMU-UI).1 It provides insights 
regarding its potential added value and discusses moral hazard issues.
1  The ZEW policy brief is a short version of Dolls et al. (2016a).
We argue that the added value of common unemployment insurance as a fiscal risk sharing device 
hinges on its ability to provide interregional smoothing. Other potential stabilization effects of EMU-
UI, such as improved counter-cyclicality or intertemporal smoothing, can be achieved, in principle, 
by countries acting alone, for example by introducing minimum conditions for national UI schemes 
or by national debt issuance. We develop a decomposition framework that assesses the effective-
ness of different EMU-UI schemes to act as an automatic stabilizer. Running counterfactual simula-
tions based on micro data for the years 2000-13, we find that 10 per cent of the income fluctuations 
caused by workers’ transitions into and out of unemployment would have been cushioned through 
interregional smoothing at euro area level. However, smoothing gains are unevenly distributed 
across countries, ranging from -5 per cent in Malta to 22 per cent in Latvia. Our results suggest that 
during 2000-13 the interregional smoothing potential has been as important as intertemporal 
smoothing through debt. Our simulations also reveal that four Member States would have been ei-
ther a permanent net contributor or net recipient. Experience rating or contingent benefits could 
limit the degree of cross-country redistribution, but might reduce desired insurance effects.
Key Messages
Research Question  
and Relevance
Possible Characteristics of an EMU-UI System
Guiding Principles and Concerns About Introducing an EMU-UI System
The Four and Five Presidents’ Report (Van Rompuy 2012, Juncker 2015), and the European Com-
mission’s blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary union (European Commis-
sion 2012), have formulated guiding principles that any euro area fiscal stabilization mechanism 
should fulfil. Specifically, it should neither lead to permanent transfers nor undermine incentives 
for national governments to address structural weaknesses in the labour market. There are con-
cerns, however, that an EMU-UI system might do exactly that, resulting in permanent transfers 
between euro area Member States, a result that would meet strong resistance from net contribu-
tor countries. Further arguments are related to moral hazard issues such as administrative ma-
nipulation and adverse incentives for national governments. It is also discussed whether the 
EMU-UI should be allowed to issue debt. There is a concern that political pressures would prevent 
the accumulation of surpluses and would instead cause the EMU-UI to increasing amounts of debt 
until a ‘bail out’ by the Member States became necessary. 
Design Options
A common unemployment insurance system for the euro area could be designed in several ways. 
Two principal options have been discussed in both the academic literature and in policy debates 
so far (see Andor 2014, Brandolini et al. 2016, Dullien 2014). A first option would be a common 
EMU-UI system that covers short-term unemployment and provides a basic level of insurance by 
partly replacing national UI systems. To limit the risk of permanent redistribution, and to preserve 
incentives for national policy-makers, long-term unemployment would not be covered. Benefits 
from the EMU-UI system could be supplemented by additional payments from national UI sys-
tems. This would allow for diversity across Member States so that existing differences in replace-
ment rates and benefit duration could be maintained. Importantly, such a scheme would provide 
direct transfers to the short-term unemployed regardless of the size of the unemployment shock 
in a given Member State. As an alternative, a common scheme could kick-in only following large 
unemployment shocks. Such a contingent EMU-UI system could also be designed as a reinsur-
ance scheme where national UI systems stay in place and there are no direct transfers from the 
EMU-UI system to the short-term unemployed, but financial flows between the European fund 
and national UI systems (Gros 2014, Dolls et al. 2016b). A further design question relevant for 
both alternatives is whether the EMU-UI should be allowed to issue debt. If debt issuance is ruled 
out, one option could be to build up reserves during economic upswings that could then provide 
a buffer during recessions. 
Empirical Approach
In our simulation experiment, we introduce an unemployment insurance scheme for the EA18 Mem-
ber States and ask what would have happened if such a scheme had been introduced at the begin-
ning of the euro in 1999. Linking micro data from the EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions 
(EU-SILC) and EU Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS), we construct a series of reweighted cross-sections 
for the simulation period which replicates changes in labour market conditions (such as the unem-
ployment rate, share of short- and long-term unemployed, and the size and composition of the la-
bour force) in each Member State. Critically, our approach can account for heterogeneity in various 
characteristics of different countries’ populations which macro data approaches cannot capture. 
We simulate the financial flows of different variants of an EMU-UI, which will be discussed below.
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EMU-UI Should Neither 
Lead to Permanent 
Transfers nor Undermine 
Incentives
Contingent vs. 
Non-Contingent EMU-UI
Our analysis is based on the following assumptions: First, we do not take into account general 
equilibrium effects of an EMU-UI system, i.e. our analysis remains in a partial equilibrium con-
text. Accounting for these macroeconomic feedback effects would require linking our micro data 
to a macro-econometric simulation model, which is done in a follow-up paper (Dolls and Lewney 
2016).2 Second, we do not simulate changes in government behaviour or individual behavioural 
responses. In the light of these assumptions, our results should be interpreted as analysing the 
‘first-round’ effects of an EMU-UI system. If EMU-UI had the desired stabilizing effects, the finan-
cial flows in the system would differ from those calculated here; the redistributive effects would 
probably be smaller. However, if the moral hazard effects dominated, the financial flows from 
contributors to recipients could also be larger.
Results and Discussion
Stabilizing Effects
Decomposition. We decompose the effect of introducing an EMU-UI system into three steps. The 
first is to harmonize national systems, that is all Member States introduce an unemployment in-
surance scheme with common features. The second step is to introduce a common EMU-UI scheme 
by pooling the contributions from all Member States in every year and to finance unemployment 
benefits from this pool using the same contribution rates in all countries. This leads to interre-
gional smoothing of unemployment shocks. The third step is to allow the EMU-UI system to run 
deficits or surpluses. This leads to intertemporal smoothing.
We simulate four UI schemes, shown in Table 1, in order to isolate and quantify the importance 
of different stabilization channels of an EMU-UI. Stabilization is measured as the fraction of the 
income change due to employment changes within a given year that is absorbed by the UI sys-
tem. We estimate the impact of harmonization by comparing the stabilization potential of actual 
national UI schemes (scheme 1) and harmonized UI schemes that fulfil certain minimum stand-
ards (scheme 2). As minimum conditions, we choose a replacement rate of 50 per cent, which 
roughly corresponds to the average replacement rate in Eurozone countries, a benefit duration 
of 12 months, and a broad coverage of all short-term unemployment with previous earnings. The 
simulated EMU-UI schemes (schemes 3 and 4) have the same payout rules, but a (geographical-
2 Dolls and Lewney (2016) is part of the project “Feasibility and Added Value of a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme”, which was initi-
ated by the European Parliament and commissioned by DG EMPL. Their paper’s key finding is that the macroeconomic stabilization impact 
depends on the design of the EMU-UI scheme, i.e. whether benefits are contingent or non-contingent, whether it is allowed to issue debt, 
and the generosity of the benefits.
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Decomposition Framework 
Provides Insights on 
Potential Added Value of 
EMU-UI
Table 1: Simulated UI Schemes
Simulated UI schemes Minimum  conditions?
Pooling of  
contributions?
Debt  
issuance?
1. Actual national UI schemes no no no
2. Harmonized national UI schemes yes no no
3. EMU-UI 
 (balanced budget in every year) yes yes no
4. EMU-UI 
 (balanced budget over the period 2000-13) yes yes yes
Notes: Actual national UI schemes (1.) as observed over the period 2000-13. We use a national UI calculator that incorporates all relevant poli-
cy rules of national UI systems. Harmonized national UI schemes (2.) need to fulfil certain minimum conditions, in particular a replacement ra-
te of 50 per cent and a maximum benefit duration of 12 months. Schemes 3 and 4 have the same generosity as scheme 2, but contibutions are 
pooled at euro area level.
ly) widened budget. Differences in stabilization effects between harmonized national UI schemes 
and the centralized EMU-UI scheme (scheme 3) are due to interregional smoothing, while inter-
temporal smoothing effects are identified by comparing EMU-UI schemes with and without debt 
issuance (scheme 4).
Harmonization gains. We find substantial heterogeneity between national UI schemes regarding 
the degree of income insurance in case of unemployment. Consequently, the stabilization gain 
for the short-term unemployed through harmonizing unemployment benefits varies across Mem-
ber States and over time. However, the combined stabilization effect of harmonized benefits and 
adjusted contributions is neutral in our analysis as more generous benefits lead to higher social 
insurance contributions. 
Smoothing gains. Table 2 presents smoothing results. We find that the simulated EMU-UI scheme 
would have provided interregional smoothing gains by cushioning 10 per cent of income fluctua-
tions that are due to transitions into and out of unemployment at euro area level. Interregional 
smoothing effects are unevenly distributed across Member States, ranging from -5 per cent in 
Malta to 22 per cent in Latvia. Overall, 17 out of 18 Member States would have been stabilized 
through interregional smoothing. At the same time we find procyclical effects in some years for 
most countries. Our results suggest that the interregional smoothing channel is as important as 
intertemporal smoothing through debt. The latter provides an additional cushioning effect of 9 
per cent at euro area level. 
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EMU-UI Could Make Fiscal 
Policy in the Euro Area 
More Countercyclical
Interregional Smoothing 
Channel as Effective as 
Intertemporal Smoothing 
Through Debt; 
Smoothing Gains Unevenly 
Distributed Across 
Member States
Table 2: Smoothing Effects of Simulated EMU-UI
Interregional Intertemporal Overall
AT 5.8 18.2 24.0
BE 3.0 14.5 17.5
CY 17.7 7.3 25.0
EE 19.4 0.8 20.2
FI 2.4 22.5 25.0
FR 7.7 12.8 20.5
GE 11.0 5.8 16.8
GR 12.0 4.8 16.9
IE 15.7 5.9 21.6
LU 7.1 18.0 25.1
LV 21.6 1.2 22.8
MT -4.6 24.9 20.3
NL 8.3 13.9 22.2
PT 13.4 5.8 19.2
SI 5.6 13.5 19.1
SK 9.6 5.6 15.2
SP 17.8 5.3 23.0
EA18 9.9 9.3 19.2
Notes: Stabilization coefficients for interregional and intertemporal smoothing weighted by shock size over the period 2000-13. Smoothing 
coefficients at EA-18 level calculated as population-weighted average of Member State’s smoothing coefficients. The unweighted smoothing 
coefficients at EA-18 level are 10.0 for interregional smoothing and 10.7 for intertemporal smoothing. Source: Dolls et al. (2016a).
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Budgetary and Redistributive Effects
The simulated EMU-UI scheme could be implemented with a relatively small annual budget. Over 
the period 2000-13, average benefits would have amounted to roughly 47 billion euros per year. 
If it were calibrated to be revenue-neutral (at euro area level) over the period 2000-13, the uni-
form contribution rate would have amounted to 1.56 per cent on employment income. The scheme 
is not designed to cause permanent redistribution across countries ex-ante because only short-
term (rather than structural) unemployment is insured. Nevertheless our simulations reveal that 
a small number of Member States would have been net contributors or net recipients in each year 
of our simulation period. Figure 1 shows that Austria, Germany and the Netherlands would have 
been the largest net contributors with average yearly net contributions of 0.19-0.39 per cent of 
GDP. Latvia and Spain are the largest net recipients (average yearly net benefits of 0.36 and 0.54 
per cent of GDP). In a companion paper, Dolls and Lewney (2016) show that a corrective measure 
such as experience rating would make permanent transfers less likely. Experience rating implies 
that contribution rates rise (fall) over time in countries that receive (contribute) more than they 
contribute (receive) to the EMU-UI system. Experience rating could also be an effective tool to at-
tenuate the risk of moral hazard, but might reduce desired insurance effects. 
Contingent EMU-UI Scheme
The rationale for a contingent EMU-UI scheme is that Member States can deal with normal busi-
ness cycle fluctuations, whereas large shocks may jeopardize social cohesion and overstrain 
public finances. Contingent benefits from the EMU-UI that only kick-in during severe recessions 
could also alleviate the risk of permanent and unidirectional transfers. We simulate an EMU-UI 
scheme with contingent benefits that is activated if the unemployment rate in year t is at least 1 
percentage point higher than the unemployment rate in i) year t-1, ii) years t-1 or t-2, iii) years t-1 
or t-2 or t-3.3 Longer look-back periods ensure that EMU-UI benefits can remain activated in sus-
tained periods of high unemployment. In all other dimensions, such as payout rules and revenue-
3  Other potential triggers could be based on changes in short-term unemployed or in the insured unemployment rate. Dolls and Lewney (2016) 
show that results from such changes are similar to those presented here.
Majority of Member States 
Net Contributor in Some  
Years and Net Recipient in 
Other Years, but Some 
Exceptions
Experience Rating Effective 
Tool to Avoid Permanent 
Redistribution and to Address 
Moral Hazard Issues
Figure 1: Average Yearly Net Contributions, 2000-13
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Note: Net contribution = social insurance contributions – benefits. Contribution rate is uniform across Member States.  
Scheme is revenue-neutral over the simulation period.  Source: Dolls et al. (2016a).
IN % OF GDP
neutrality at euro area level, the contingent benefit schemes are identical to the baseline EMU-UI 
scheme (scheme 4 in Table 1).
We find that with a three-year look-back period, contingent benefits would have been triggered 
in all Member States at least once and no country would have been a permanent net contributor 
or net recipient. With average yearly benefits of 13, 19 and 22 billion euros at the Eurozonelevel, 
the overall budget of the three contingent EMU-UI schemes is significantly smaller compared to 
the non-contingent EMU-UI scheme (47 billion euros per year). Figure 2 shows selected countries’ 
cumulative net contributions to the baseline and to the three contingent EMU-UI schemes. France, 
a net recipient at the end of the simulation period in the baseline, becomes a net contributor un-
der contingent benefit schemes ii) and iii). In the Netherlands, accumulated net contributions are 
reduced by more than 50 per cent by the end of the simulation period relative to the baseline. 
Spain, a net recipient in the baseline throughout the simulation period, becomes a net contribu-
tor until 2007 and a net recipient in the remaining years. These results show that an EMU-UI sys-
tem with contingent benefits could indeed provide more targeted transfers to Member States 
which see their labour market conditions significantly deteriorating.
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Figure 2: Cumulative Net Contributions – Contingent Benefits
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Note: Baseline and contingent benefits. Contingent scheme i): Benefits are paid if unemployment rate in year t is at least 1 percentage point 
higher than in t-1 (one-year look-back period). Contingent scheme ii): 2-year look-back period. Contingent scheme iii): 3-year look-back period. 
Source: Dolls et al. (2016a).
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EMU-UI with Contingent 
Benefits Would Provide 
More Target Transfers, 
but Might Reduce Desired 
Insurance Effects
Conclusion
The Eurozone’s economic crisis has revived debates about deeper fiscal integration and has ele- 
vated this topic to the top of the European policy agenda. A common unemployment insurance 
system is one widely discussed reform proposal. Supporters argue that a centralized EMU-UI sys-
tem would cushion asymmetric shocks in the Eurozone and provide income insurance to the most 
vulnerable households. It would thus not only improve the economic resilience of the EMU and 
make its institutional architecture more sustainable, but it would also strengthen the social di-
mension of European policy-making. However, main concerns include the risk of permanent trans-
fer flows across Member States and moral hazard for national economic policies, administrations, 
and individuals. These moral hazard effects would lead to more, rather than less unemployment. 
Our paper has analysed the potential added value of an EMU-UI which hinges on its ability to pro-
vide interregional smoothing. We have shown that during the time period under examination the 
interregional smoothing potential has been as large as the intertemporal smoothing effect. While 
the simulated EMU-UI schemes are not designed to give rise to permanent redistribution across 
countries, our results suggest that permanent transfers cannot be ruled out if no correcting meas-
ure, such as experience rating, is implemented. Experience rating might also be an effective tool 
to address moral hazard issues. Finally, our analysis shows that EMU-UI with contingent benefits 
would lead to less cross-country redistribution as it would provide more targeted transfers to 
Member States with deteriorating labour market conditions.
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